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ABSTRACT
Social media has become the norm of everyone for communication and also as a main-
stream in everyday life. (1). The usage of social media has increased exponentially
in the last decade. The myriads of Social media services such as Facebook, Twitter,
Snapchat, and Instagram etc allow people to connect with their friends, and followers
freely. The attackers who try to take advantage of this situation has also increased at
an exponential rate. Every social media service has its own recommender systems and
user profiling algorithms(2). These algorithms use users current information to make
different recommendations. Often the data that is formed from social media services
is Linked data as each item/user is usually linked with other users/items. Recom-
mender systems due to their ubiquitous and prominent nature are prone to several
forms of attacks(11). One of the major form of attacks is poisoning the training set
data. As recommender systems use current user/item information as the training set
to make recommendations, the attacker tries to modify the training set in such a way
that the recommender system would benefit the attacker or give incorrect recommen-
dations and hence failing in its basic functionality (10). Most existing training set
attack algorithms work with “flat” attribute-value data which is typically assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) (4) . However, the i.i.d. as-
sumption does not hold for social media data since it is inherently linked as described
above. Usage of user-similarity with Graph Regularizer in morphing the training data
produces best results to attacker (3). This thesis proves the same by demonstrating
experiments on Collaborative Filtering with multiple datasets.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Social media has become the most important aspect of everyday life. Nowadays,
most communication is done through social media. Imagining a life without social
media for example Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat etc has become much harder.
Number of active users in Facebook has increased from around 100 million in 2008
to more than 2 billion people in 2018; Instagram has almost a billion users now while
it had only 90 million users five years back in 2013. The rate of increase is quite
similar in other social media services such as Twitter and Snapchat from their in-
ception. In each form of social media, the relation between users are similar with
each user connected to multiple users as friends or followers.(1) This paper mainly
focuses on Recommender systems and User profiling algorithms. Recommender sys-
tems use the relations between users on the social media service to suggest potential
friends or followers in all of social media. On the other hand, User profiling algo-
rithms make models of each user based on their activity on the social media service.
User-profiling algorithms use these models for suggestions and recommendations.(6)
In most of the algorithms, user-product relation is represented as a matrix with each
value in the matrix representing affinity of user in the corresponding row to prod-
uct of the corresponding column. As these matrices are incomplete, algorithms like
collaborative-filtering try to fill them by using user similarity matching.(15) As rec-
ommender systems play a vital role, they are susceptible to different types of attacks.
We are exploring one form of attack called data-poisoning where the attacker tries to
morph the training data for recommender system and user profiling algorithms (10).
In this type of attack, a malicious party creates a set of users with preferences in such
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a way that, the recommender systems benefit the attacker. Data poisoning attacks
could be of two types. In one case, recommender system might benefit one user or one
product or in the other the system might make completely obsolete recommendations.
In both cases, credibility of the model is lost.
Many existing algorithms working on graph linked data assume that the data is
independent and identically distributed. But social media data is linked data in which
each user is connected to other user and hence the assumption of i.i.d assumption on
the data is no longer valid. The problem of linked data is very well described in Tang
et al(3). In social media data, the users tend to form groups having much intra-
connections in the group than inter-connections with users of other groups. Having
this type of linkage makes the i.i.d assumption obsolete.
We present a systematic approach to computing near-optimal data poisoning at-
tacks for factorization- based collaborative filtering/recommendation models. We
assume a highly motivated attacker with knowledge of both the learning algorithms
and parameters of the learner following the Kerckhoffs principle to ensure reliable
vulnerability analysis in the worst case.
An attacker would want to conceal his attacks by doing minimal manipulations
to the training data that produce the best results as mentioned in this paper. The
main aim of the attacker would be to make as few changes as possible to the data
and disrupt the system to his favor as much as the attacker could. This would be a
bi-level optimization problem. Our main contributions in this paper are
• Formalizing this bi-level optimization problem using user similarity as a metric
for attack.
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• Our second contribution is to demonstrate our attack framework on Linked
graph data.
The rest of the paper is defined as follows. We formally define the problem of data
poisoning attacks on linked data using user similarity in section 3; introduce our new
framework for data poisoning in section 3, with KKT conditions and user-similarity;
present empirical evaluation with discussion in Section 4 and the related work in
Section 5; and conclude this work in Section 6.
3
Chapter 2
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We discuss our problem statement here and formulate the optimization to solve.
In this paper, scalars are denoted by lower-case letters (a, b, . . .), vectors are written
as lower-case bolded letters (a, b, . . .), and matrices correspond to boldfaced upper-
case letters (A, B, . . .). We also assume that attacker is fully aware of the system’s
learning algorithm. There are two types of Machine learner problems for social media.
We formulate the both of them using following equations.
θˆD  argminθD OL(D, θ),
s.t. gi(θ) ≤ 0, i = 1...m,
hi(θ) = 0, i = 1...p
min
XRmxn
||R(M-X)||2F , s.t. rank(X) ≤ k,
Where D is training data. In classic machine learning, D is an iid sample from the
underlying task distribution but in the case of social media, D cannot be iid as dis-
cussed above in the introduction because of the linkage between the data. OL(D, θ) is
the learner’s objective: For example, regularized risk minimization can be formulated
as
OL(D, θ) = RL(D, θ) + λδθ
where, for some learner’s empirical risk function RL and regularizer δ. The g and h
functions are potentially nonlinear; together with the hypothesis space θ they deter-
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mine the feasible region. θˆD is the learned model (recall argmin returns the set of
minimizers).
In equation 4, we consider machine learners that can be posed as a matrix com-
pletion problem which are also optimization problems. Let MRmn be a data matrix
consisting of m rows and n columns. Mij for i[m]andj[n] would then correspond to
the rating the ith user gives for the jth item. We use δ = (i, j) : Mij is observed to
denote all observable entries in M and assume that |δ||| ¡¡ mn. We also use i [n] and
j [m] for columns (rows) that are observable at the ith row (jth column). The goal of
collaborative filtering (also referred to as matrix completion in the statistical learning
literature [2]) is then to recover the complete matrix M from few observations M.
One standard assumption is that M is a low ranked matrix which can be obtained
by solving equation 4.
5
Chapter 3
PROPOSED METHOD
The increase in online user usage has led to a variety of information which could
be used in multiple ways. If one wants to watch a movie, it would be a painful expe-
rience to go through all the movies and pick one. Recommender systems help users
to ease their process of selection by suggesting items to users that users might find
beneficial. Recommender systems are the essential parts of most software companies
ranging from Google search to Amazon Ecommerce to Netflix video recommendations
etc. They also have become a key part of people’s social life via Facebook, Twitter,
Youtube, and Netflix etc. Online recommender systems root back to several disci-
plines such as cognitive science, information retrieval, and etc. Precise recommender
systems help both the spectrum of industry i.e. Users and Vendors. Users would find
their targets easily and Vendors would in turn make profits in less time than needed
and also keep customers happy. Netflix through its contest awarded 1 million dollars
to the team that improved their recommender system’s accuracy.
Due to their dominance, they became an independent area of research from mid
1990s. Social Networks in online platforms increase the social life of people. Social
recommender systems help people find their potential friends or inspirational figures
etc. There are many approaches in solving social recommender systems. One of the
most frequent way used is collaborative filtering. In a typical collaborative filtering
systems an n*m user matrix is created, where n users preferences about m products
are represented as ratings. The collaborative filtering systems maps similar users and
similar movies and tries to predict unseen ratings. With the increase in prominence
of social recommender systems using collaborative filtering, the threats from people
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who want to misuse them increase exponentially. Malicious users or rival companies
try to insert fake users or manipulate the data matrix available for two main pur-
poses. Malicious users want to change the recommender systems in such a way that
it recommends the items that are valuable for malicious users more frequently. While
the rival companies tend to inject fake users so as to decrease the accuracy of the
recommender system.
These type of attacks are called shilling attacks. In the case of social networks
like Facebook, malicious users might want to increase their popularity and hence
inject the recommendation system in such a way that it suggests them. The same
case follows for Youtube, Twitter and etc. In the case of Netflix, rival companies
might introduce injections to reduce its accuracy. While the e-commerce systems like
Amazon, Zappos are vulnerable for both kinds of attacks.
3.0.1 Identifying K.K.T. Conditions
In this section, we talk about how to identify the KKT conditions of our bi-level
optimization problem and formulate them. Bi-level optimization problems are NP
hard in general. We present an efficient solution for a broad class of training- set
attacks. Specifically, we require the attack space D to be differentiable (e.g. the
attacker can change the continuous features in D for classification, or the real-valued
target in D for regression). Attacks on a discrete D, such as changing the labels in D
for classification, are left as future work. We also require the learner to have a convex
and regular objective OL.
Under these conditions, the bi-level problem Eq (5) can be reduced to a single-level
constrained optimization problem via the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of
the lower-level problem (Burges 1998). We first introduce KKT multipliers i,i = 1...m
and i,i = 1...p for the lower-level constraints g and h, respectively. Since the lower-
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level problem is regular, we replace the lower-level problem with its KKT conditions
(the constraints are stationarity, complementary slackness, primal and dual feasibility,
respectively):
3.0.2 Attack Against Matrix Factorization Systems
Most of the recommender systems use Matrix Factorization systems, here we
formulate our attacks on those systems. In the attack against collaborative filtering,
the data matrix consists of m users and n items. Since, every user wouldn’t have
rated every field in the matrix is not filled in and collaborative filtering algorithms
is used to fill in the matrix. An attacker can add αm users. Since, we would like to
avoid being detected each user can give his preference only up to N items and in the
range of -l, l. The main reason behind it is to go undetected from the agent.
These are the notations used in the paper. M as the original matrix. M with a cap
to represent the matrix that consists of all the malicious users. The dimensonality of
original Matrix is m * n and the dimensionality of malicious matrix M cap is alpha
m * n. Alpham represents number of malicious users. Since, we want a risk averse
model, we assume the maximum value of alpha to be 0.3. Since, this is a bi-level
optimization problem, equation 4 in the problem statement can now be formulated
as
θλ(Mˆ : M) = argminU,Uˆ,V T ||Rω(M − UV T )||2F+
||Rωˆ(Mˆ − UˆV T )||2F + 2λU(||U ||2F + ||Uˆ ||2F ) + 2λV (||V ||2F )
where the resulting output consists of low rank latent factors U, U cap without
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or with malicious users respectively while
The sign from the equation is a variable consisting of low-rank matrix factors U,
U cap, and V repressing normal users, malicious users and items respectively. The
Graph Regularization term used in the equation helps finding optimized U, U cap,
and V values. We have M cap = UVT. The goal of the attacker is to find optimal
malicious users, M cap such that, Equation 6 from the paper.
Here M = new M is the malicious data which we use to attack the collaborative
filtering system. And S(Mcap, M) denotes the utility score that describes how good
the attack is.
There could be two kinds of attacks based on the attacker utility.
3.0.3 Availability Attack
The main aim of this attack is to disrupt the collaborative systems so that it
gives completely different predictions. Lets say that M dash is the systems prediction
without data poisoning and M cap is the systems prediction. Then the utility function
is defined as follows.
Rav(Mˆ,M) = R(Mˆ − M¯)2
. The effectiveness of the attack is defined by the value of R, the higher it is the more
severe the attack is.
3.0.4 Integrity attack
The main aim of this attack is to make few items in the set more popular. Let
J is that subset and w is the weightage given to each item in set J by the attacker.
Then the utility function is defined as follows.
Rin(Mˆ,M) = Σmi=1ΣjJ0w(j)M.
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Where function R is the loss function for integrity function and and M hat is the
prediction of system with data poisoning attack and M is predictions without data
poisoning attack
3.0.5 Optimal Attack Strategy
We use the projected gradient agent (PGA) method for solving the optimization
problem in Eq. (6) with respect to the alternating minimization (12) formulation in
Eq. (4). In iteration t we update M cap as follows.
Mˆ
∗
 argminMˆMR(Mˆ(θλ(Mˆ ;M)),M)
Here, projection gradient is used so we keep all the malicious users preferences in
a range of (-v, v) and st is the step size. Note that the estimated matrix M depends
on the model (M ; M) learnt on the joint data matrix, which further depends on the
malicious users M . Since the constraint set M is highly non-convex, we generate B
items uniformly at random for each malicious user to rate. The ProjM() operator
then reduces to projecting each malicious users rating vector onto an l ball of diameter
, which can be easily evaluated by truncating all entries in M at the level of .
We next show how to (approximately) compute M R(M ,M). This is challenging
because one of the arguments in the loss function involves an implicit optimization
problem. We first apply chain rule to arrive at
OMˆR(Mˆ,M) = OMˆθλ(Mˆ ;M)OθR(Mˆ,M)
10
Figure 3.1: Algorithm Used
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Chapter 4
EXPERIMENTS
4.0.1 Data
In this section we explain the datasets that we used, and pre-processing that we
made to the datasets to fit to this problem. To evaluate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed poisoning attack strategy, we use the publicly available MovieLens dataset(cite)
for testing attacks on Collaborative-Filtering. The dataset contains 20 millions rat-
ings and 465,000 tag applications applied to 27,000 movies by 138,000 users [23].
Each user who has watched a movie rates the movie from 1 to 5. We shift the rat-
ing range to [-2, 2] for computation convenience and setting neutrality to zero. To
avoid the cold-start problem, we consider users who have rated at least 20 movies.
The second dataset that we used is Amazon Instant Video dataset which has ratings
about amazon videos, we removed users that have less than 10 ratings. Statistics of
the dataset can be found on Table2. Precisely, even though several users are removed
by preprocessing, Amazon dataset is still extremely sparse compared to the others.
Two metrics are employed to measure the relative performance of the systems before
and after data poisoning attacks: root mean square error (RMSE) for the predicted
unseen entries and average rating for specific items.
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Figure 4.1: Availabality Attack on MovieLens Dataset
Figure 4.2: Integrity Attack on MovieLens Dataset
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Figure 4.3: Availabality Attack on Amazon Instant Dataset
Figure 4.4: Integrity Attack on Amazon Instant Dataset
Table 4.1: Movielens Dataset Statistics
Statistics
Users 943
Movies 1682
Ratings 100,000
Table 4.2: Amazon Instant Video Dataset Statistics
Statistics
Users 5000
Movies 10843
Ratings 50,000
The first step of our experiment was to check the best value for the hyper-
parameter Regularization constant as this was crucial in determining how significant
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Graph Regularization is for Linked data, we have tried values ranging from 0.001 to
100 for the same. The results can be seen in the figure below when experimented
with availability attack along with integrity attack. Figure1, and Figure2 clearly de-
picts for availability attacks that Utility value linearly increases with reguralization
constant peaking at the value of 1 and then starts decreasing from there. The same
can be said for integrity attacks that the graph follows the same trend while utility
peaks when reguralization constant is 0.84 by looking at figures 3, 4.
Our first experiment with malicious data was to test the bi-level optimization
problem with graph regularization on MovieLens data with collaborative filtering on
availability attacks.
Table 4.3: Malicious Percent with Utility for Movielens Dataset on Availability Attack
Malicious percent utility utility with Graph regularization
0.05 6.63 21.603
0.1 17.43 25.501
0.15 31.000 34.444
0.2 53.541 54.058
0.25 67.309 68.681
As you can see from the figures from 1 to 4, the movielens dataset being more
dense than Amazon Instant Video dataset produces better results.
The above table depicts how much the error rises with the rise in Malicious per-
centage of users. As you can see, the increase is semi-linear with the peak slope
occurring at 0.1 percent of malicious users. The calculation of utility value is mea-
sured as per equation 6. The third column explains the utility value when bi-level
optimization is done with graph regularization. As you can see, the utility value is
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Table 4.4: Malicious Percent with Utility for Amazon Instant Video Dataset for
Availability Attack
Malicious percent utility utility with Graph regularization
0.05 31.778 63.921
0.1 43.194 71.642
0.15 43.160 67.434
0.2 53.671 128.675
0.25 63.497 136.933
almost double with graph regularization.
Table 4.5: Regularization Constant at 1
Malicious percent utility with Graph regularization for MovieLens dataset on AA
0.05 21.603
0.1 25.501
0.15 34.444
0.2 54.058
0.25 68.681
As we discussed above, integrity attacks are widely popular as the key aim in most
attacks is to increase the popularity of few items which might have been sponsored
by the attackers. To see how data poisoning attacks fare with integrity attacks we
have repeated similar experiments as above for Collaborative filtering with Graph
Regularization on integrity attacks.
The above table depicts how much the error rises with the rise in Malicious per-
centage of users. As you can see, the increase is semi-linear with the peak slope
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Table 4.6: Malicious Percent with Utility for Movielens Dataset on Integrity Attack
Malicious percent utility utility with Graph regularization
0.05 2.779 3.242
0.1 3.197 4.053
0.15 3.174 4.364
0.2 3.677 4.562
0.25 3.497 4.863
Table 4.7: Malicious Percent with Utility for Amazon Instant Video Dataset on In-
tegrity Attack
Malicious percent utility utility with Graph regularization
0.05 0.716 1.611
0.1 1.607 2.029
0.15 2.288 2.897
0.2 3.346 3.058
0.25 2.284 3.572
occurring at 0.1 percent of malicious users. The calculation of utility value is mea-
sured as per equation 6. The third column explains the utility value when bi-level
optimization is done with graph regularization. As you can see, the utility value is
almost double with graph regularization.
After hyper-parameter tuning for regularization constant, we got the best results
at the regularization constant as 1. The utility value at different percentage of mali-
cious users is given in the above table.
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Table 4.8: Regularization Constant at 1
Malicious percent utility with Graph regularization on Movielens dataset with IA
0.05 3.242
0.1 4.053
0.15 4.364
0.2 4.562
0.25 4.863
18
Chapter 5
FUTURE WORK
Although we focused on formulating the optimal training-set attack in this paper,
our ultimate goal for the poisoning attack analysis is to develop possible defensive
strategies based on the careful analysis of adversarial behaviors. Our optimal training-
set attack formulation opens the door for an alternative defense: flagging the parts
of training data likely to be attacked and focus human analysts attention on those
parts. And also, since the poisoning data is optimized based on the attackers mali-
cious objectives, the correlations among features within a feature vector may change
to appear different from normal instances. Therefore, tracking and detecting devi-
ations in the feature correlations and other accuracy metrics can be one potential
defense. Additionally, defender can also apply the combinational models or sampling
strategies, such as bagging, to reduce the influence of poisoning attacks. We would
also like to extend our work in other Machine Learning algorithms like SVM for clas-
sification tasks to prove that Graph Regularization is ubiquitous in getting the best
attacks when used in social media platforms as the data present over there is not i.i.d.
19
Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
As you can see that from the above results, a simple addition of graph regularization
in the bi-level optimization sky-rockets the utility values which show the effectiveness
of the solution. The increase in the utility values you can see from the results is near
linear in case of both integrity attacks and availability attacks.
We would like to conclude by saying that graph regularization is a less explored
feature, which goes well with linked data for example social media data as the data
is not i.i.d.
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● What are our contributions in this thesis ?
● What are the results ?
● Any future work plans ?
Agenda
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● Matrix factorization for collaborative filtering
● It is widely used in various recommender systems
● Ex: Finding affinity relations, recommendations
Collaborative Filtering for Recommender Systems
● Poisoning the training data to break recommender systems
● Loss of trust
● Availability attack
○  Recommender system gives 
 wrong recommendations as 
 other fruits should be 
 recommended first
● Integrity attack
○ In this scenario, attacker might be
promoting items like milk, and 
hence it is recommended.
Data poisoning for collaborative filtering
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● Data poisoning has been applied to classification based SVM systems
● The experiments were done on wine dataset
● Reference: Shike Mei and Xiaojin Zhu. “Using Machine Teaching to Identify Optimal Training-Set 
Attacks on Machine Learners.” In: AAAI. 2015, pp. 2871–2877
Related work on Classification based SVM systems
● Data poisoning for recommender systems, proposed in 2016 NIPS
● The work was done on MovieLens dataset 
● The optimization function for this thesis was built based off of this paper
Reference: Bo Li and Yining Wang. “Data poisoning attacks on 
factorization-based collaborative filtering”. In Advances in Neural Information 
Processing Systems (NIPS*), 2016a.
*NIPS is now called NeurIPS
Related work
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Structure of Linked Data
● IID: Each datapoint is mutually independent and follows the same distribution
● In the context of social media, the data does not hold iid assumption as each user/product is linked 
to one another thus creating linked data
Invalid IID assumption
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● Formulating the bi-level optimization function by using graph regularization 
● Pre-processing the datasets and experimenting to find the best hyper parameters
● Experimentally proving that using graph regularization produces better results for data poisoning 
attacks
Our Contributions in this thesis
Attacks with Graph Regularization
● Optimization function without Graph Regularization
● Optimization function with Graph Regularization 
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● Availability attack:
● Integrity attack:
Loss/Reward function for availability attack and integrity attack
● MovieLens 100k dataset is formulated by GroupLens Research
● The dataset that we used consists of 943 users rating 1682 movies
● A total of 100,000 ratings were recorded
● Each rating is in a range from 0 to 4
MovieLens dataset
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● This dataset has 5,073 users who have rated 10,843 items
● There were around 50,000 ratings in total
Amazon Instant Video dataset
● Malicious user percentages to be injected
● Regularization Constant 
● Dimensionality of Latent Vectors
Hyper-parameters used for experiments
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Results on MovieLens dataset
Results on Amazon instant video dataset
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● From the experimental results from both the datasets we can see that using graph regularization 
easily outperforms the ones without using it. 
● Graph regularization is a less explored feature 
Conclusions
● Expansion to Classification based models
● Building Defense systems against data poisoning attacks
Future Work
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● Bo Li and Yining Wang. “Data poisoning attacks on factorization-based 
collaborative filtering”. In Advances in Neural Information Processing 
Systems (NIPS*), 2016a.
● Shike Mei and Xiaojin Zhu. “Using Machine Teaching to Identify Optimal 
Training-Set Attacks on Machine Learners.” In: AAAI. 2015, pp. 2871–2877
● J. Tang and H. Liu. “Feature selection with linked data in social media”. In 
SDM, 2012.
● Amazon Instant Video Dataset
● MovieLens Dataset
Major references
Thank you
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